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ExEcutivE summary
Russian-American relations are structurally asymmetri-
cal. Apart from nuclear parity, in all other spheres there are 
serious disproportions between the two states, in favour of 
the United States. The two countries’ mutual political and 
economic importance is also asymmetrical. Russian atti-
tudes towards the US are ambivalent and fluctuate in cycles, 
although anti-US sentiment has been rising consistently. In 
the sphere of political interests, Russia still has unmet ex-
pectations vis-à-vis the US. The dynamics of Russia’s policy 
towards the United States over the last sixteen years has 
been characterised by cyclic oscillations. The recurrent pat-
tern starts with a normalisation and positive dynamics in 
mutual relations at the start of each new US president’s term, 
and ends with an escalation of tensions and a crisis towards 
the end of the presidency. There seem to be structural reasons 
for this: Russia is too weak to be treated by the US as a part-
ner or opponent on an equal footing, but is too strong to be 
willing or able to accept the status of an inequitable, tactical 
ally. Besides, Moscow has nothing positive to offer to the US, 
apart from possibly restraining, to some extent, those of its 
policies which harm the interests of the US. Making predic-
tions about the Russian-American relations in this situation 
is very risky. However, in view of the above factors, the most 
probable scenario is that the same pattern will be repeated 
and the initial mutual attempts at a ‘reset’ will be followed 
in the longer term by a souring of bilateral relations. How-
ever, that does not necessarily mean that Russia will suffer 
an inevitable strategic defeat, as it may try to take advantage 
of the likely further weakening of the United States and the 
West. 
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introduction
During Vladimir Putin’s third term as the president of Russia and Ba-
rack Obama’s second term as president of the US, Russia-US relations 
slipped into the deepest crisis since the end of the Cold War and the 
break-up of the Soviet Union. When Donald Trump took office as presi-
dent on 20 January 2017, a new chapter in Russian-American relations 
was opened. This is a moment to ask questions about the future out-
look of those relations, which, in turn, leads to even more fundamental 
questions about the extent to which the causes of the most recent crisis 
were structural in nature, and whether relations are likely to deterio-
rate again after a temporary normalisation; or whether, on the con-
trary, the reasons why relations had been deteriorating will turn out 
to be transitory, and the two states will find a modus vivendi which may 
not necessarily be friendly, but at least will be stable and pragmatic. 
The answers to those questions depend on various factors includ-
ing the political, economic and security dynamics in the United 
States and Russia, and in the states and regions important for 
their respective foreign policies. Those dynamics will, in turn, be 
determined partly by the recent historical experiences of Russia 
and the United States and the respective interpretations of those 
experiences by the current political leaders of both states. 
The present paper focuses on one of the parties, Russia. It presents 
the circumstances which have shaped Russia’s policy towards the 
United States over the last sixteen years, i.e. the period of Vladimir 
Putin’s formal or de facto leadership, policy dynamics, and the con-
clusions that can be drawn from an analysis of those circumstanc-
es. The paper is mainly concerned with the position that the United 
States has occupied in Russia’s policy, Russia’s objectives and its ways 
of pursuing them. Because of the specific nature of Russia’s authori-
tarian political system, the paper focuses on presenting and analys-
ing the rhetoric and activities of the ruling group led by Vladimir 
Putin. On this basis, the paper formulates predictions about the 
prospects for Russia’s policy and Russian-American relations. 
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i. thE foundations: thE conditions shaping 
russia’s policy towards thE unitEd statEs 
In order to understand the dynamics of Russia’s policy towards 
the United States, one needs to look at its foundations and the sig-
nificant factors that determine them. In particular, it is impor-
tant to compare Russia’s and the US’s military potentials, examine 
their bilateral economic relations, analyse public perceptions of 
the US in Russia, and finally, consider Russia’s strategic political 
interests insofar as they concern the United States. 
1. Security: military (dis)parity
Military might is the key component in the self-perception of Rus-
sia (its elites and general public) as a world power (it is also seen 
in Russia as a criterion of world power status in general). This is 
of crucial importance for the way Russian-American relations are 
perceived in Russia. During the Cold War, a global bipolar order 
existed in which the Soviet Union and the United States main-
tained military parity and competed for global influence. The 
crisis and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union was not only 
a huge trauma for the Russian elite and people, but also entailed 
the real degradation of Russia’s potential and its international 
influence. The military sphere, and more precisely the sphere of 
nuclear weapons, is the only one in which Russia has managed to 
preserve some degree of parity with the United States. Today, it 
is the only remnant of the Soviet Union’s former status as a su-
per-power.1 That is why Russia has striven so hard to preserve 
its nuclear potential and parity in the nuclear sphere, for exam-
ple, by maintaining dialogue on nuclear disarmament with the 
United States. The ruling elite in Russia perceives the country’s 
nuclear potential as the main reason why the United States does 
1 While Russia’s permanent membership in the UN Security Council and its 
veto rights are an important symbol and hallmark of Russia’s status as a glob-
al power, Moscow shares that status with four other states, which makes it 
less unique.
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not ignore Russia completely today, and Moscow likes to remind 
Washington of this, especially in periods of heightened tensions 
in bilateral relations.2
According to official figures published by Washington and Mos-
cow, as well as expert estimates, Russia’s nuclear potential is 
currently comparable to that of the United States, and in some 
categories Russia even has a small quantitative and qualitative 
advantage (better mobility).3
Table 1. Comparison of the nuclear potentials of Russia and the 
United States
parameter numbers in the us numbers in russia
Strategic delivery vehicles,* 
total 
848 847
Deployed strategic delivery 
vehicles * 
681 508
Deployed strategic nuclear 
warheads 
1367 1796
2 This refers, for instance, to the publicity given to (often multiple) tests of 
Russia’s ballistic missiles or overflights by Russian strategic bombers in the 
vicinity of US overseas military bases. 
3 See ‘New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms, 
Fact Sheet, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance’, US De-
partment of State, 1 October 2016, https://www.state.gov/documents/organi-
zation/262836.pdf; Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, Russian Nuclear 
Forces, 2016, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 72:3, 15 April 2016, http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/00963402.2016.1170359; Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, 
Russian Nuclear Forces, 2016, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 73:1, 2 Janu-
ary 2017, http://thebulletin.org/2017/january/united-states-nuclear-forc-
es-201710380; Amy F. Woolf, Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, Congressional 
Research Service, 23 March 2016, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf; 
Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces Under New START; https://www.armscon-
trol.org/factsheets/Russian-Strategic-Nuclear-Forces-Under-New-START; 
http://russianforces.org/ 
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parameter numbers in the us numbers in russia
Strategic nuclear warheads, 
total 
4480** + 2500 ? ***  
= <7000 ?
2600 ? + 2800 ?  
= 5400 ?**** 
Tactical nuclear payloads ~760 ?***** 
~2000 ? *****
(1000 ? – 6000 ?) *****
* Total intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched bal-
listic missiles (SLBM), heavy strategic bombers according to the calculation 
principles adopted in the START treaties, as of 1 September 2016; ** according 
to figures from the US Department of Defence (January 2017) as of 30 Septem-
ber 2016; *** according to figures from the US Department of Defence; **** esti-
mates by H.M. Kristensen and R.S. Norris of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; 
***** estimates by various authors, cited by A.F. Woolf of the Congressional 
Research Service. 
Author’s calculations on the basis of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, www.
armscontrol.org; Congressional Research Service; Bureau of Arms Control, 
Verification and Compliance, US Department of State
While the nuclear potentials of Russia and the United States are 
approximately equal, there is a huge general disproportion be-
tween the countries when it comes to conventional weapons, 
with Russia having a much smaller potential. This disproportion 
is visible in the comparison of the defence spending of the USA 
(US$595.5 billion in 2015, according to SIPRI) and of Russia (US$91 
billion, i.e. 5.5 times less).4 The US armed forces are also nearly 
twice as large as the Russian military, and better equipped. For 
instance, they have twice as many combat aircraft and helicop-
ters. The fact that the US has 10 aircraft carriers, compared to only 
one held by Russia, is a good illustration of the disproportion in 
the two countries’ ability to project power, even though the total 
numbers of warships, including submarines, is comparable. Rus-
sia has a clear advantage over the US when it comes to the number 
4 The fact that a portion of Russia’s defence spending is hidden under classified 
or non-military budget lines, and the differences in purchasing power parity 
and the costs of manufacturing domestically produced weapons make Rus-
sia’s defence spending relatively more effective, does not significantly alter 
this picture.
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
2/
20
17
10
of tanks (twice as many in Russia), artillery (four times as many) 
and multiple rocket launchers (three times as many).5 Due to 
geographic reasons as well as political decisions, Russia also has 
a clear regional advantage in terms of the size of conventional 
forces in the European theatre. In 2016, the United States had only 
around 65,000 troops in Europe (including only around 1000 on 
NATO’s eastern flank)6, whereas Russia at that time had an esti-
mated 400,000 troops on its western flank (in the Western and 
Southern Military Districts, and in several countries of Eastern 
Europe and the South Caucasus).
Arms are, generally speaking, the most technologically ad-
vanced products that the Russian industry is capable of produc-
ing, and one of Russia’s few technologically advanced export 
commodities. Yet despite that fact, and some isolated successful 
rollouts of Russian technology, it is nonetheless legitimate to say 
that there is a certain technological gap between Russian and 
American combat aircraft, warships, precision weapons and 
stealth technologies. 
2. Economy: weak trade ties
The disproportion and asymmetry of the potentials and mutual 
importance of Russia and the United States is particularly obvi-
ous in economic terms. With the world’s biggest nominal GDP 
(US$18 trillion in 2015), the United States is economically much 
stronger than Russia, which ranks 13th globally with a GDP of 
US$1.3 trillion.7 Despite its efforts, Russia has not managed to 
5 See Military Balance 2016, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
London 2016; www.globalfirepower.com 
6 Data as of 30 September 2016, quoted after: Total Military Personnel and De-
pendent End Strength By Service, Regional Area, and Country, Defense Man-
power Data Center, 7 November 2016; the number of US troops in Central Europe 
has been gradually increasing since January 2017 in connection with the deploy-
ment of a brigade battle group of around 4000 US soldiers in the region. 
7 Figures from the World Bank, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/down-
load/GDP.pdf 
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establish strong economic foundations for its relations with the 
US, as the figures on mutual trade illustrate. 
According to US figures, in the first year of Vladimir Putin’s rule 
in Russia (2000), Russian-American trade turnover was US$9.7 
billion (of this, Russian exports accounted for US$7.6 billion) 
and increased systematically in the following years (except for 
a slump in the crisis year of 2009), until 2011 when it reached a re-
cord level of US$43 billion (Russian exports to the US account-
ing for US$34.6 billion). This growth was related to the peak of 
Russian oil and petroleum product exports to the United States, 
which reached a level of around 228 million barrels (31 million 
tonnes, corresponding to 5.5% of total imports to the US) in 2011.8 
Since then, trade has been declining, and collapsed in 2015, drop-
ping to US$23.5 billion (in this, Russian exports accounted for 
US$16.4 billion).9 Such a dynamic is hardly surprising, given that 
on average around 70% of Russian exports to the United States 
consisted of raw materials (mostly oil and petroleum products 
whose prices suddenly dropped by more than 50% in the autumn 
of 2014).10 Moreover, in August 2014 counter-sanctions against 
Russia were introduced, which blocked the importation of US 
food products to Russia. 
The disproportion between Russia’s and the United States’ economic poten-
tials has nonetheless decreased noticeably since 2000, when the US econo-
my (with nominal GDP at around US$ 10.3 trillion) was 37 times larger than 
the Russian economy (around US$ 280 billion).
8 Data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA), https://www.eia.
gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_a.htm 
9 Data from the US Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/
balance/c4621.html In the same period, exports of Russian oil and petroleum 
products to the US dropped to a mere 120 million barrels (accounting for 
16.4 million tonnes and 3.6% of total imports to the US) in 2014, and 135 mil-
lion barrels (18.4 million tonnes or 3.9% of total imports in 2015. See the EIA 
figures, https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_
im0_mbbl_a.htm 
10 http://izvestia.ru/news/588941#ixzz4U3inbUg1 
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Table 2. Trade turnover between Russia and the US in the years 
2013–2016
indicators 2013 2014 2015 2016 *
trade turnover in us$ billions
USA figures / Russia figures
38.2 /
27.5
34.4 / 
29.2
23.5 /
21
18.7 /
18.2 
Exports from russia to the us 
in us$ billions 
USA figures / Russia figures
27.1 /
11.1
23.7 /
10.7
16.4 /
9.5
13.3 /
imports from the us to russia 
in us$ billions - 
USA figures / Russia figures
11.1 /
16.3
10.7 /
18.5
7.1 /
11.5 5.4 /
Balance for russia  
in us$ billions - 
USA figures / Russia figures
+16 /
- 5.2
+13 /
- 7.8
+ 9.3 /
- 2 + 7.8 /
* January–November 2016 
Author’s calculations on the basis of information from the US Census Bureau; 
https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4621.html; State Statistics 
Committee of the Russian Federation
The above figures illustrate the weakness of the economic basis of 
Russian-American relations. That weakness becomes even more 
prominent if one looks at the significance of mutual trade ex-
change for the two states’ economies. For Russia, the United States 
is an important partner, although certainly not the most impor-
tant. According to Russian statistics, the United States ranked 
8th among Russia’s trading partners in 2015, accounting for a 4% 
share in total trade turnover. The US ranked 11th among markets 
for Russian goods (just after Poland), with a share of around 2.8% 
in Russian exports. At the same time, however, the United States 
was an important source of imports to Russia, despite the mutual 
sanctions in place since the summer of 2014 (ranking 3rd, with 
a 6.25% share in total imports). 
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The picture looks different for the United States. US statistics show 
Russia to be an insignificant trading partner. In 2015 it ranked 37th 
among the markets for American goods (accounting for 0.47% of 
total exports) and 24th among states of origin for imports to the US 
(accounting for 0.73% of total imports).11 The Russian economy and 
its exports are centred on raw materials, which does not bode well 
for the dynamics of Russian-American trade relations in the long 
term, given the decreasing demand for energy resource imports 
in the US as a result of the ‘energy revolution’.
Even though Russia is potentially an attractive destination for US 
investors, especially from the energy sector, the realisation of that 
potential has been hindered by the current depressed prices and 
the unfavourable political and investment climate. This is also 
borne out by statistics. According to figures from the Central Bank 
of Russia on net accumulated foreign direct investments (FDI) in 
Russia in the years 1994–2015, the US ranks only 12th among inves-
tors, accounting for slightly less than US$ 9 billion (around 2.5% 
of total investments).12 
This situation could potentially change as a result of the strate-
gic co-operation agreements concluded in the period from 2011 
to 2014 (concerning the exploration and extraction of oil and gas 
in the Russian Arctic shelf and the Black Sea), as well as the ex-
change of assets between the US oil company ExxonMobil and 
Russia’s state-controlled oil company Rosneft. Under the agree-
ments, ExxonMobil was expected to invest around US$3 billion 
in Russia during the initial phase. However, the implementation 
of the joint projects stumbled on the US sanctions imposed on 
Rosneft and some Russian energy projects, as well as on the de-
clining oil prices, which made the exploitation of the Arctic fields 
11 Figures from the US Census Bureau; http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/
Press-Release/2015pr/final_revisions/exh13py.txt 
12 See: http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/nakoplennye-inostrannye-investitsii-
v-rossiyskih-regionah-territorialnaya-struktura-i-rol-ofshornogo-kapitala; 
http://www.cbr.ru/statistics/?PrtId=svs 
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unprofitable. However, ExxonMobil and Rosneft (in partnership 
with Japanese companies) are continuing their joint gas extrac-
tion and LNG production in Sakhalin in Russia’s Far East, initi-
ated in 1996 (the Sakhalin 1 project). 
3. The people: ambivalent perceptions of the US in Russia
Foreign policy does not exist in a vacuum, but is normally influ-
enced by social conditions and perceptions. However, Russia is 
an authoritarian state in which so-called public opinion has lit-
tle influence over politics, especially foreign policy, and socio-
logical studies seem to suggest that public sentiments revealed in 
opinion polls strongly correlate with changes in the state propa-
ganda’s narrative about Russia’s external environment (and that 
narrative, in turn, reflects the leadership’s changing tactics). This 
is because the government-controlled mass media in Russia are 
able to effectively influence the public’s views (90% of Russians 
rely for their news on the television, which transmits state prop-
aganda; only 30% look for alternative sources of information on 
the Internet). Moreover, respondents in polls often conceal their 
real views, refusing to answer questions or lying to align their 
answers with what they perceive to be the current binding ‘politi-
cal line’. Nonetheless, it is unquestionable that the poll results do 
reflect the real views of a large portion of the Russian public and 
correctly identify public opinion trends. 
Even with such distorted and uncertain sources of information 
about the Russian public’s views, one cannot but notice some 
characteristic phenomena. An analysis of the trends in the Rus-
sian public opinion’s views of the US in the last 15 years (see the 
chart below) leads to several conclusions.
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
2/
20
17
15
20
15
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
16
010203040506070809010
0
%
D
at
a 
fro
m
 p
ol
l b
y 
Le
va
da
 C
en
tre
(m
on
th
ly
 u
nt
il 
M
ar
ch
 2
00
8,
 th
er
ea
fte
r e
ve
ry
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s)
po
si
tiv
e 
at
tit
ud
e 
to
w
ar
ds
 th
e 
U
S
ne
ga
tiv
e 
at
tit
ud
e 
to
w
ar
ds
 th
e 
U
S
in
te
rp
ol
at
ed
 d
at
a
09
.2
00
1
03
.2
00
2
07
.2
00
2
08
.2
00
4
09
.2
00
8
11
.2
01
1
03
.2
00
3
04
.2
00
7
05
.2
00
6
01
.2
01
5
11
.2
01
6
02
.2
00
7
Pu
tin
in
 M
un
ic
h
03
–0
5.
20
03
in
te
rv
en
tio
n
in
 Ir
aq
09
.2
00
1
te
rr
or
is
t
at
ta
ck
s
in
 th
e 
U
SA
 
12
.2
01
1
st
ar
t
of
 p
ro
te
st
s
in
 R
us
si
a
08
.2
00
8
Ru
ss
ia
n-
-G
eo
rg
ia
n
w
ar
11
.2
01
3
st
ar
t
of
 U
kr
ai
ne
cr
is
is
03
.2
01
4
an
ne
xa
tio
n
of
 C
rim
ea
11
.2
01
6
el
ec
tio
ns
in
 U
S
03
.2
00
9
st
ar
t o
f
th
e 
're
se
t'
Russian attitudes towards the US in opinion poll results
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Firstly, the views on the US and its policy fluctuate, sometimes 
considerably. They tend to be generally positive in periods of prag-
matic co-operation between Russia and the US, and deteriorate 
rapidly in periods of crises, usually in connection with US foreign 
political-military interventions. That was the case in 1999 when 
the United States and NATO intervened in Kosovo, in 2002–2003 
during the Iraq crisis and the subsequent US intervention, and 
in the summer of 2008 during the Russian-Georgian war (for 
the outbreak of which the United States was co-responsible, ac-
cording to Russian propaganda). That has also been the case since 
2014 in connection with the crisis and war in Ukraine, with the 
Kremlin’s propaganda representing the Russian aggression as 
a civil war in Ukraine and an effort to avert the consequences of 
the Ukrainian ‘coup’ allegedly staged by the West, especially the 
US. Historically, the tendency was for positive views of the US to 
quickly re-emerge in polls following the resolution of the given 
crisis. The current crisis which started in early 2014 is different, 
though: this time the perceptions of American have deteriorated 
to unprecedentedly low levels. 
Secondly, irrespective of the periodic fluctuations, anti-Ameri-
canism has been increasing systematically in Russia. In each suc-
cessive crisis, the negative trend in perceptions has been deeper, 
and following normalisation, views have typically stabilised at 
lower level than before. Thirdly, an analysis of the polls in greater 
depth reveals that Russians hold persistently ambivalent feelings 
about the Americans. On the one hand, the US is admired for its 
power and modernity, and its people for their rationality and en-
trepreneurial spirit. American mass culture (films, music) is as 
popular in Russia as in many Western countries. The Russians 
appreciate US-made computers, office equipment and telephones. 
Children of rich and influential Russians often study in the US, 
and some businesspeople and state officials purchase real estate 
and shop in the US (sometimes secretly; the practice has become 
more difficult in recent years because of the Kremlin’s pressure to 
step up control of the elite). At the same time, however, the US is 
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often condemned for its aspirations to global hegemony, aggres-
siveness and tendency to interfere in other states’ internal af-
fairs. Americans are accused of arrogance, hypocrisy, simplicity 
and spiritual and moral poverty. Against this background, it is 
not surprising that a majority of the Russian public authentically 
supports the policy of challenging the United States’ foreign and 
security policy which President Putin has been pursuing in his 
third term.13 However, for the reasons described above, the Rus-
sians will not have any problems with quickly and visibly adopt-
ing more favourable views of the US the moment the Kremlin’s 
political tactics and propaganda line so require. 
4. Politics: Russia’s expectations and grievances 
Any analysis of the dynamics of Russia’s policy towards the Unit-
ed States requires a look into the Russian leadership’s official nar-
ratives on the United States and how they have evolved over the 
last sixteen years. Those narratives include some distinctive re-
current elements, such as criticism of the United States and its 
policies, and calls for policy change, which effectively reflect the 
conditions on which Russia would be willing to develop more 
positive relations with the US and demonstrate Moscow’s specific 
understanding of what ‘equal partnership’ with the United States 
means. On the basis of official Russian statements and documents, 
and the explicit or implicit messages formulated therein, it is pos-
sible to compile a list of Russia’s expectations and grievances vis-
à-vis the United States.
13 For more information on the deeper conclusions from an analysis of trends 
in the Russian public opinion’s perceptions of the United States, see Денис 
Волков, История Российского антиамериканизма: почему в России 
стали считать США врагом, Moscow Carnegie Centre, 27 May 2015, http://
carnegie.ru/2015/05/27/ru-60220/i9kf; Денис Волков, Почему мы не 
любим Америку, Ведомости, 24 April 2016, http://www.vedomosti.ru/
opinion/articles/2016/04/25/638889-pochemu-mi-ne-lyubim-ameriku 
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Table 3. Russia’s expectations and grievances vis-à-vis the United 
States (selected issues)
sp
he
re what russia accuses  
the us of doing 
what russia expects  
of the us
Ru
ss
ia
’s 
in
te
rn
al
 a
ff
ai
rs
 – interference in Russia’s internal 
affairs; 
 – public criticism of Russia’s inter-
nal policy; 
 – supporting political opposition; 
 – attempts at changing Russia’s 
political regime; 
 – distributing information that 
compromises the Russian au-
thorities;
 – espionage; 
 – prosecuting Russian nationals in 
third countries; 
 – (previously) insufficient co-opera-
tion in fighting terrorism / support-
ing terrorism/separatism in the 
North Caucasus
 – to refrain from criticising Rus-
sia’s internal policy and attempt-
ing to interfere with that policy; 
 – to refrain from attempts at 
changing Russia’s political regime 
or undermining its leadership; 
 – to release Viktor Bout from prison 
and hand him over to Russia.
In the optimum variant: to sup-
port the Russian authorities and 
strengthen their legitimacy.
Th
e 
po
st
-S
ov
ie
t a
re
a 
(o
th
er
 th
an
 th
e 
Ba
lti
c S
ta
te
s)
 – supporting the ‘export of demo-
cratic revolutions’ to countries in 
the region and undermining Rus-
sian influence in those countries;
 – attempting to sabotage Eurasian 
integration; 
 – (previously) initiating and sup-
porting anti-Russian inter-state 
structures (GUAM, the Community 
of Democratic Choice); 
 – developing political and mili-
tary co-operation with Ukraine, 
and supporting Ukraine’s and 
Georgia’s potential membership 
in NATO as well as their and Mol-
dova’s integration with the EU; 
 – (previously) attempting to step up 
its military presence in the South 
Caucasus and maintain its military 
presence in Central Asia
 – to refrain from any involvement 
or presence in the post-Soviet 
area which have not been agreed 
with Russia; 
 – to recognise the post-Soviet area 
as Russia’s sphere of influence; 
 – to refrain from developing mili-
tary co-operation and any closer 
co-operation with the post-Soviet 
states; 
 – to establish formal relations 
and start co-operation with the 
Eurasian Economic Union and 
the Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation. 
In the optimum variant: to support 
Russia’s role as the hegemon of the 
post-Soviet space and the leader of 
its integration.
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sp
he
re what russia accuses  
the us of doing 
what russia expects  
of the us
Eu
ro
pe
 – stepping up its military presence 
in Central Europe; 
 – orientating NATO towards ‘ag-
gressive activities’ against Russia; 
 – pushing for further NATO en-
largement (especially to the east); 
 – pressing the EU and its leading 
member states to push for an 
‘anti-Russian policy’ and prevent-
ing their closer co-operation with 
Russia; 
 – sabotaging important EU-Russian 
economic co-operation projects; 
 – encouraging the EU to be active 
in its Eastern membership and 
crowd out Russian influence; 
 – attempting to use the OSCE 
institutions and instruments to 
‘export democratic revolutions’ to 
the Eastern neighbourhood. 
 – to restrain its presence, and 
especially military presence, in 
Europe, including Central Europe 
in particular; 
 – to refrain from any further NATO 
enlargement; 
 – to create in Central Europe 
a partly demilitarised, de facto 
buffer zone;
 – to withdraw US tactical nuclear 
weapons from Europe;
 – to refrain from obstructing the 
development of closer Russian-
European co-operation; 
 – to refrain from attempts at restrain-
ing Russian influence in Europe.
In the optimum variant: to support 
the development of a new security 
architecture in Europe, in which 
Russia would be an equal partner; 
possibly also to develop trilateral 
political and economic co-opera-
tion in Europe/Eurasia (together 
with the EU and Russia). 
M
id
dl
e 
Ea
st
 – attempting to restrain Russia’s 
presence and influence in the 
Greater Middle East; 
 – destabilising the region by 
organising and supporting the 
Arab Spring as an ‘anti-Russian 
geopolitical project’; involvement 
in the illegal regime change in 
Libya and Egypt;
 – pressing Syria and striving to 
topple the Assad regime, support-
ing terror groups in Syria, trying 
to obstruct Russia’s co-operation 
with the Assad regime and with 
Iran in Syria; 
 – to give up the policy of toppling 
undemocratic regimes in the 
Greater Middle East (including 
Syria); 
 – to refrain from attempts at re-
straining Russia’s presence and 
influence in the region;
 – to establish a coalition with Rus-
sia to fight terrorism and Islamic 
radicalism.
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sp
he
re what russia accuses  
the us of doing 
what russia expects  
of the us
M
id
dl
e 
Ea
st
 – putting political pressure on Iran 
and trying to thwart its co-opera-
tion with Russia; 
 – failing to recognise Russia’s role 
in the regulation of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict; 
 – ineffective stabilisation efforts 
in Iraq and Afghanistan and 
attempts at restraining Russia’s 
co-operation with those states;
 – insufficient co-operation with 
Russia in fighting terrorism and 
Islamic radicalism / supporting 
Islamic radicalism
In the optimum variant: to recog-
nise Russia as a key player which 
jointly decides on the resolution 
of problems in the Greater Middle 
East; to actively support Russia 
politically, financially and intel-
ligence-wise in the ‘fight against 
terrorism’.
A
si
a 
/ P
ac
ifi
c
 – attempting to separate Russia 
from China and India and under-
mine Russia’s co-operation with 
those countries;
 – stepping up military presence 
and developing closer military 
co-operation with Japan, South 
Korea, South-East Asian states 
and Australia, and encouraging 
those states to pursue ‘anti-Rus-
sian’ policies; 
 – attempting to crowd Russia out of 
the arms markets in the region.
 – to restrain US military presence 
and military co-operation in the 
region;
 – to refrain from seeking to thwart 
Russia’s co-operation with coun-
tries in the region.
In the optimum variant: to recog-
nise Russia’s right to jointly decide 
on security matters in the region; 
to ‘compensate’ Russia for not 
pursuing closer co-operation with 
China.
O
th
er
 re
gi
on
s
 – attempting to thwart Russia’s 
closer co-operation with certain 
countries (including Venezuela, 
Cuba, Brazil, Argentina and 
South Africa);
 – attempting to crowd Russia out of 
the regional arms markets.
 – to refrain from attempts at re-
straining Russia’s activities in the 
regions in question.
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sp
he
re what russia accuses  
the us of doing 
what russia expects  
of the us
Gl
ob
al
 e
co
no
m
y
 – imposing financial and economic 
sanctions on Russia and encour-
aging other states to join them; 
 – maintaining restrictions on 
advanced technology exports to 
Russia;
 – promoting multilateral trade 
agreements which undermine 
Russia’s interests (TTIP, TTP); 
 – (previously) hindering Russia’s ac-
cession to the WTO; failing to abolish 
the Jackson-Vanik amendment
 – to lift all sanctions and restric-
tions imposed on Russia; 
 – to refrain from concluding 
multilateral trade deals in which 
Russia does not participate.
Gl
ob
al
 se
cu
ri
ty
 – unilaterally using military force 
(including under the pretext of 
humanitarian interventions) in 
violation of international law and 
against Russia’s objections; 
 – withdrawing from the ABM 
Treaty and disturbing the stra-
tegic equilibrium by developing 
missile defence, including in 
Europe and Asia; 
 – developing military technologies 
dangerous to Russia, including 
precision weapons; 
 – developing plans to militarise 
space; 
 – carrying out cyber-attacks 
against Russia; 
 – using the internet for information 
activities targeting Russia and its 
interests.
 – to refrain from military interven-
tions if Russia objects and if they 
are not mandated by the UN; 
 – to abandon its missile defence 
plans, or develop them in co-
operation with Russia; 
 – to refrain from developing new 
military technologies dangerous 
to Russia; 
 – to impose limits on the freedom of 
the internet; 
 – to reach agreement on refraining 
from cyber-attacks;
 – to support an international ban 
on unconstitutional government 
change.
In the optimum variant: recognis-
ing Russia’s right to jointly decide 
on global security matters; to 
refrain from any actions in this 
sphere to which Russia objects; to 
create an international governance 
structure for the internet, with 
Russia’s involvement.
Author’s own selection and interpretation, based on statements and documents pub-
lished by the Russian Presidential Administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Russia, the Ministry of Defence of Russia and media reports.
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It is not too difficult to notice that the above list, inevitably sim-
plified as it is, reveals that Russia has perceived and continues to 
perceive the United States as a strategic opponent whose policy 
not only harms many of Russia’s vital interests but also poses a di-
rect threat to Russia, and especially the Russian leadership. Even 
the numerous deals concluded with the United States and exam-
ples of pragmatic co-operation (see below) have never fully oblit-
erated this distrust (sometimes quite irrational) and the sense of 
threat. Paradoxically, the Russian leadership can simultaneously 
claim (and apparently believe) that the United States is a ‘declin-
ing power’ in the process of losing its global influence, and yet it 
is a dangerous enemy of Russia; that it has been ignoring Russia 
and its interests, and yet is focused on countering and harming 
Russia. Those paradoxical elements in Russia’s perceptions have 
determined Moscow’s policy towards the United States over the 
last sixteen years.
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ii. dynamics of russia’s policy towards 
thE unitEd statEs
Russian-American relations have a turbulent history in which 
the defining moments include the Russian Empire’s friendly 
approach to the US at the onset of its independence, the sale of 
Alaska to the United States, the joint fight against Germany and 
its allies in the two World Wars, but also fierce global rivalry dur-
ing the Cold War. The Soviet Union’s crisis and collapse destroyed 
the bipolar global order and seriously weakened Russia, inflicting 
a trauma which still affects the perceptions of the Russian leader-
ship. Its members still believe the myth that the US deliberately 
caused the break-up of the USSR in order to change the global and 
regional balance of power in Russia’s disfavour, even though this 
view has little to do with reality (the US was in fact surprised and 
concerned by the Soviet Union’s break-up, and awkwardly tried 
to prevent it).14 Nevertheless, that myth continues to influence 
the Russian leadership’s political decisions. The period that fol-
lowed the Soviet Union’s collapse, i.e. the Yeltsin era in the 1990s, 
brought many moments of crisis and tension in mutual relations 
(for example, during the US and NATO airstrikes in Bosnia & Her-
zegovina in 1995, and during the Chechen war in 1994–6), but also 
periods of pragmatic co-operation (including in the sphere of nu-
clear disarmament). Russia owes its gradual inclusion in the G7, 
the restructuring of its debt and financial assistance from the IMF 
and the World Bank mainly to the positive attitude of the United 
States. Today the Kremlin prefers to view those times as a period 
of Russia’s weakness of which the US took advantage, and seeks 
to revise the post-Cold War order, which it considers to be unjust. 
This ‘Putinist’ interpretation of recent history has contributed 
massively to Russian-American problems in the 21st century. 
14 For more information, see Serhii Plokhy, The Last Empire. The Final Days of 
the Soviet Union, New York 2014.
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1. Russia and the late Clinton era (1999–2000): the Kosovo 
shock and reactions to trauma 
New Year’s Eve on 31 December 1999, when Vladimir Putin took 
over from Boris Yeltsin as President of Russia, marked the begin-
ning of a new chapter not only for Russia, but also for Russian-
American relations. Putin took office at a difficult time for Rus-
sia. Although the country was already recovering from the deep 
financial crisis of 1998, it had to face a fresh trauma as a result of 
the Kosovo crisis in spring 1999. The NATO airstrikes against Yu-
goslavia, which had not been mandated by the UN Security Coun-
cil and continued for nearly three months (despite Russia’s firm 
objections), revealed the impotence of the Russian state, which 
stood in glaring contrast to its actively promoted image of itself as 
a great power.
The first eastward enlargement of NATO15 which happened at the 
same time (and included Poland, the Czech Republic and Hun-
gary) was seen by Moscow as the West’s symbolic consummation 
of its Cold War victory, even though NATO’s political deal with 
Russia as expressed in the Founding Act in a way ‘compensated’ 
for it. On the other hand, the United States and most European 
countries signed the compromise Adapted Conventional Forces in 
Europe Treaty (CFE) with Russia, closing several years of difficult 
negotiations, at the Istanbul summit in November 1999, that is, 
at the height of the Second Chechen War, when Russia was being 
heavily criticised by the West for its extreme brutality.16 
Yet the then US President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State 
Madelaine Albright nonetheless became symbols of US liberal 
15 In the years 1993-1996 Russia’s diplomacy had actively campaigned against 
that enlargement, and even afterwards Moscow never fully accepted it. 
16 Russia gained more freedom to deploy forces in its territory covered by the 
Treaty. Ceilings on a potential deployment of NATO forces in Central Europe 
were agreed. Russia committed itself to withdrawing its forces from Georgia 
and Moldova. 
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interventionism for Moscow. The tactic which Putin adopted in 
that situation consisted of a combination of pragmatic rhetoric 
and quite assertive real policies (which was almost the exact op-
posite of Yeltsin’s tactic). On the one hand, he pledged (while still 
Russia’s prime minister in December 199917) to rebuild Russia’s po-
sition as a world power by focusing on economic development, and 
also (while already acting President in March 200018) declared 
that he would not rule out Russia’s membership in NATO. On the 
other, he started to rebuild or develop closer relations with coun-
tries hostile to the United States, such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, North 
Korea, Libya and Cuba; for instance, in November 2000 Moscow 
withdrew from the 1995 deal with the US over Iran.19 At that time, 
it became a priority for Russian diplomacy to block US plans, ini-
tiated by the Clinton administration, to build a strategic missile 
defence system. To that end, Moscow strove to win the backing of 
non-Western powers such as China and India, and tried (ineffec-
tively) to persuade Washington’s main European allies to back its 
own alternative proposal (presented in June 2000) to build a US-
-European-Russian system. 
2. Russia and George W. Bush’s two terms (2001–2008): 
from the ‘pro-Western turn’ to the Georgia crisis 
Some Russian experts believe, not without reason, that the Krem-
lin traditionally prefers to deal with Republican administrations 
in the US, seeing them as more willing to pragmatically ‘talk 
business’ and not interested in promoting democracy, while the 
Democrats are seen as willing to reach agreement, but also likely 
to support regime change in undemocratic countries and invoke 
17 Vladimir Putin, Россия на рубеже тысячелетий, Независимая газета, 
30 December 1999, http://www.ng.ru/politics/1999-12-30/4_millenium.html
18 BBC Breakfast with Frost, Interview: Vladimir Putin, 5 March 2000; http://
news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/audio_video/programmes/breakfast_
with_frost/transcripts/putin5.mar.txt 
19 Under the deal, Russia agreed not to conclude new contracts for the provision 
of arms and nuclear technology to Iran.
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values in politics. From this point of view, the presidency of George 
W. Bush must have been quite a disappointment for Moscow. 
Right after Bush took office, the new administration took some 
assertive steps which Russia saw as affronts; for example, it ex-
pelled 50 Russian diplomats from the US on charges of espionage 
in March 200120, pledged to build a missile defence system, and 
announced that NATO would be enlarged further. Rhetorically, 
Moscow’s reaction was restrained, and the Russian leadership 
clearly adopted a new tactic: in summer the same year Russia 
signalled that it was ready to approve changes to the ABM Treaty 
(which had been blocking the creation of the missile shield) and to 
close down its signals intelligence station in Lourdes, Cuba.21 The 
first orientation meeting between Putin and Bush in Ljubljana in 
June 2001 warmed up the atmosphere22, but fell short of resolv-
ing the contentious issues. It was probably already then that the 
Kremlin made the decision, practically implemented after the 9/11 
terror attacks in the US, to make pragmatic gestures towards the 
US and the West. 
The September 11 attacks, which marked a watershed in US poli-
tics, also revealed Putin’s ability to move quickly and creatively 
take advantage of a political opportunity as it appears. During 
a meeting with the leaders of the security institutions on 22 Sep-
tember Putin, reportedly against the opinion of most of the other 
20 This was very clearly a reaction to the discovery, two months before, that 
Robert Hansen, a high-ranking FBI officer, was a Russian spy. In January 
2001 the FBI had arrested Pavel Borodin, the state secretary of the Union of 
Russia and Belarus, on a visit to New York, and in February 2001 the CIA chief 
George Tenet publicly accused Russia of selling military nuclear and missile 
technologies to Iran, China, India and North Korea. 
21 It is worth noting that Russia and Cuba had signed a deal extending the 
station’s operation in December 2000. Russia’s decision to close down the 
Lourdes centre was formally announced in the new political situation after 
the September 11 attacks. 
22 It was after this meeting that the President Bush famously said: “I looked the 
man in the eye. […] I was able to get a sense of his soul.”
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participants, decided that Russia would offer the United States 
limited support in its retaliatory actions (for instance by open-
ing air corridors, not objecting to the use of airfields in Central 
Asia, and stepping up assistance to the anti-Taliban opposition 
in Afghanistan). Moscow did not object to the US attack on Af-
ghanistan, and also announced the closure of its radar station in 
Lourdes, Cuba, as well as the Cam Ranh naval base in Vietnam 
(October 2001). Moreover, it authorised new sanctions against 
Iraq (November 2001). In the atmosphere of the so-called pro-
Western turn in Russia’s foreign policy, Moscow opened inten-
sive talks, also with Washington, about a new format for political 
and security relations between Russia and NATO as the Kremlin, 
guided by cold calculation, noticed an opportunity to achieve at 
least some of its political goals (see Part I) through bargaining and 
making deals with the West, especially the United States. 
Russia’s new tactic was only partly successful. Even though a dec-
laration on the new format of Russia-NATO relations was signed in 
May 2002, Moscow gained less than it had expected (in particu-
lar, it did not gain the right to effectively influence the Alliance’s 
decisions). The declaration was also a case of political ‘cross-sale’ 
intended to compensate Russia for the fact that in November 2002, 
another group of Central European states would be invited to join 
NATO, including the Baltic States, against whose accession Moscow 
had battled politically for the previous nine years. Russia failed to 
prevent the United States’ withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (the 
decision was announced in December 2001 and came into force 
in June 2002), even though it managed to persuade Washington 
to sign a new (less ambitious and very perfunctory disarmament 
treaty that restated the formal nuclear parity between the two 
sides (the SORT Treaty signed in May 2002). In the meantime, Rus-
sia started to publicly express its dissatisfaction with the United 
States’ lingering military presence in Central Asia.
At the same time, Moscow had great expectations concerning the 
Russian-American energy dialogue initiated in May 2002. The 
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first test delivery of Russian oil to the US by the private-owned oil 
company Yukos took place in July 2002, and during the bilateral 
energy summit in Houston in October 2002 Russian companies 
declared that they were ready to supply up to 85 million tonnes of 
oil a year to the United States (a pledge that never materialised). 
Russia hoped that by laying a foundation for stronger economic 
relations with the US (based on co-operation among energy com-
panies) it could stabilise mutual relations and foster the develop-
ment of a lobby, consisting mainly of US energy companies, which 
would advocate for closer co-operation with Russia. Moscow also 
obtained tangible financial gains in the form of lower anti-dump-
ing duties as a result of the United States’ decision to recognise 
Russia as a market economy, as well as a boost to its prestige when 
it was granted full membership of the G8 in June 2002. 
Russia made some limited concessions on Iraq to the US (includ-
ing limited sanctions), but that did not stop the United States from 
launching an armed operation against the country in March-May 
2003. The intervention was a hard blow to the prestige of Mos-
cow, which had, along with Germany and France, been engaged 
in a diplomatic campaign against military intervention in Iraq 
(while at the same time secretly selling weapons to Iraq and prof-
iting informally from the trade in Iraqi oil as part of the Oil-for-
Food programme). Moscow’s harsh criticism of the US over Iraq 
was nonetheless accompanied by efforts to ensure Russia’s partic-
ipation in the post-war political settlement for the country. Rus-
sia also carefully manoeuvred its way with regard to Iran. Facing 
growing criticism from Washington over its co-operation with 
Tehran, Moscow decided to conclude a new informal Iran deal 
with the United States (May/June 2003).23 
23 For instance, Russia pledged to make the launch of the Bushehr nuclear pow-
er plant which it was building conditional on Tehran’s consent to provide ad-
ditional guarantees that the spent nuclear fuel would not be used for military 
purposes (the guarantees were indeed provided).
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Around the same time, the so-called ‘colour revolutions’ in the 
post-Soviet area became a new source of major tensions between 
Russia and the US. Moscow saw ‘Washington’s hand’ in the devel-
opments and treated them as the execution of an alleged US plan 
to undermine Russian influence in the remaining post-Soviet 
countries.24 The event that vexed Moscow most was the ‘Orange 
Revolution’ in Ukraine in the autumn of 2004. The victory of the 
pro-Western opposition provoked Moscow to criticise the West, 
and especially the United States, harshly and publicly for sup-
porting the ‘export of revolutions’ in the post-Soviet area. From 
Russia’s point of view, the Ukrainian revolution thwarted its plan 
to take strategic control over Ukraine as part of its Eurasian inte-
gration project. On top of that, throughout the year 2004 Russia, 
and especially the North Caucasus, was shaken by terror attacks 
organised by Chechen separatists and Islamic radicals. After the 
most dramatic attack in September 2004, in which a school in Be-
slan was targeted and around 330 persons, mostly children, lost 
their lives, President Putin and his chief ideologist Vladislav Surk-
ov formulated an unprecedented accusation against anonymous 
groups of influence (including ‘in America’), claiming that there 
was an international conspiracy to destroy Russian statehood.25 
The allegations very clearly alluded to the mythical ‘Brzezinski 
plan’, an alleged US scheme to encircle, weaken and divide Russia. 
Against this backdrop, the allegations that the US was sponsor-
ing the ‘Tulip Revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan which ousted President 
Askar Akayev in March 2005 were only a modest addition. In the 
24 The then foreign minister of Russia, Igor Ivanov, publicly accused the US of 
involvement in the ousting of the Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze 
in the ‘Rose Revolution’ in November 2003, and of thwarting the Russian plan 
to resolve the problem of Transnistria in December 2003 (the latter had been 
particularly humiliating for Putin, who at the last moment had to cancel his 
visit to Moldova, where he had been expecting to sign a deal that would grant 
Russia a permanent lever to influence Chisinau).
25 See President Putin’s address to the nation on 4 September 2004 http://krem-
lin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22589; and the interview with Vladislav 
Surkov in Komsomolskaya Pravda, 28 September 2004, http://www.kp.ru/
daily/23370/32473/ 
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aftermath of those developments, the Kremlin de facto started to 
consider US policy as posing a threat to Russia.26 
Guided by a sense of threat from the United States, the Kremlin 
decided at the onset of Bush’s second term (2005–2008) to adopt 
the tactic of persuading Washington to make a deal on the de-
limitation of interests. Russian representatives repeatedly com-
municated their postulates to the US side. Most importantly, they 
expected the US to renounce any attempts at influencing Russia’s 
internal policy (and to refrain from publicly criticising Russia’s 
rising authoritarianism), and to recognise the post-Soviet area as 
a Russian sphere of influence and not intervene in that area, es-
pecially against Russia’s interests.27 At that time Moscow did not 
take any stronger anti-US steps, also for image-related reasons: it 
wanted leading Western politicians to be present at the celebra-
tions of the 60th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany 
in Moscow (May 2005) and the G8 summit in St. Petersburg (July 
2006). At the same time, the Russian leadership tried to demon-
strate its ability to constructively influence the problem of Iran’s 
military nuclear programme, partly to fend off US pressure for 
stronger sanctions against Iran. To that end, in autumn 2005 it 
26 In this context, it is paradoxical that some of Putin’s statements could be 
seen as expressions of support for George W. Bush (and not the Democratic 
candidate John Kerry) in the 2004 US presidential election (however, the 
elections took place before the ‘Orange Revolution’ broke out). The strongest 
message of endorsement for Bush came with President Putin’s statement in 
a press conference in Dushanbe, Tajikistan on 18 October 2004. The Russian 
leader said on that occasion that the aim of international terrorism was to 
prevent the re-election of George W. Bush as US President, and if that aim 
were achieved, it would be a success for the terrorists, who would then step 
up their international activities. 
27 Such was the tone of statements by many high-ranking Russian state officials. 
Cf. the interview with the Russian deputy foreign minister Vitaly Trubnikov, 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12 May 2004, http://www.ng.ru/world/2004-05-12/1_
trubnikov.html; Сергей Лавров, Демократия, международное управление 
и будущее мироустройство, Россия в глобальной политике, No.6/2004, De-
cember 2004, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_4201; and the state-
ment by defence minister Sergei Ivanov in the Council on Foreign Relations, 
New York, 13 January 2005. 
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made a (failed) attempt at persuading Tehran to accept Russian 
proposals to resolve the problem (in the hope that the initiative’s 
success would enable Russia to stop the implementation of the US 
missile shield project, one of the aims of which was to protect Eu-
rope from a missile attack from Iran).
The signals coming from Moscow about Russia’s willingness to 
conclude a strategic agreement with the United States had a cold 
reception in Washington.28 Meanwhile, the good situation in the 
resource markets, which was generating huge revenues for Rus-
sia, strengthened Russia’s sense of assertiveness. In that situ-
ation, the Russian leadership decided to adopt a tougher line on 
the United States. This change, also reflected in a new rhetoric, 
was symbolically marked by President Putin’s famous speech at 
the Munich conference in February 2007, in which he criticised 
the US in very harsh terms.29 The Munich arguments were not 
new, but the strong way in which they were formulated signalled 
the end of Russia’s tactic of brushing over problems in relations 
with the US and making limited concessions to Washington. Af-
ter a preparatory information and diplomatic campaign, in June 
2007 the Kremlin presented the US with (unrealistic) proposals 
to jointly build a strategic missile defence system.30 Facing a cold 
28 The US’s attitude found a symbolic expression in the statement by US Vice-
President Richard Cheney in Vilnius in May 2006, in which he was very criti-
cal of Russia, and accused Moscow of abandoning the principles of democracy 
and using energy as a weapon against its neighbours (Cheney was referring 
to the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis in early 2006).
29 In his speech, Putin fiercely criticised US foreign and security policy, claim-
ing it was unilateral and based on force, destabilised international security 
and undermined the existing arms control and disarmament regimes. See 
President Putin’s statement at the Munich conference, 10 February 2007, 
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034 
30 During the intensive Russian-American talks in October 2007, Moscow ef-
fectively restated the conditions on which it would be willing to accept the 
shield project. These concerned the joint assessment of missile threats, the 
development of an integrated anti-missile system with Russia (which would 
include the radar station in Gabala, Azerbaijan and Russia’s new radar sta-
tion in Armavir, and have one of its two projected command centres based 
in Moscow), and Moscow’s right to jointly decide on the use of the system. 
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reaction from Washington, in July Putin de facto withdrew from 
(formally suspended) the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Eu-
rope (CFE). Before that happened, the US and other NATO coun-
tries had rejected Russia’s proposals to further revise the treaty 
in favour of Moscow. In August, Russia resumed regular patrol 
flights by nuclear-armed bombers for the first time since the end 
of the Cold War. Another demonstration of Moscow’s new aggres-
sive policy came with the massive cyber-attack on Estonia in April 
and May, and the missile attack on Georgia in August 2007. After 
this series of events, Moscow put forward a proposal to establish 
a ‘new 21st-century concert of powers’ (trilateral co-operation be-
tween Russia, the EU and the US in the Euro-Atlantic area), which 
was presented in September 2007 in a policy speech delivered by 
Minister Lavrov at the MGIMO.31 Washington did not respond. 
What followed was an escalation of tensions stemming from what 
Russia perceived as the West’s crossing of the ‘red lines’ previously 
drawn by Moscow (recognition of Kosovo’s independence, devel-
opment of the missile shield, the further eastward enlargement of 
NATO).32 Kosovo proclaimed its independence in February 2008 
and was quite quickly recognised by the United States and most 
other Western states, which triggered a strong reaction in Russia. 
At the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008 (where the political 
decision on the future accession of Ukraine and Georgia was taken) 
President Putin warned about the possible break-up of Ukraine.33 
Moscow also demanded that the project should be frozen for some time. Such 
conditions were unacceptable to the US side, which was prepared to accept 
the co-operation of two separate systems (one American and one Russian), 
Russian inspections of the shield facilities and an exchange of data; it was 
also prepared to postpone the activation of the shield. 
31 See Sergei Lavrov’s address during the inauguration of the academic year 
at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), 3 Sep-
tember 2007, http://www.mid.ru/press_service/minister_speeches/-/as-
set_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/364540 
32 Ibidem. 
33 President Putin’s statement during the NATO summit in Bucharest, 4 April 
2008, http://www.unian.net/politics/110868-vyistuplenie-vladimira-puti-
na-na-sammite-nato-buharest-4-aprelya-2008-goda.html 
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At that point, preparations for the war with Georgia were already 
underway (Putin would later admit that he had approved the war 
plans in late 2006 or early 2007).34 
In those circumstances, the formal change in the president’s seat 
in May 2008 when Putin’s loyal aide and designee, the former PM 
Dmitry Medvedev took office, was not going to change much, es-
pecially since Medvedev never gained real political independence. 
As prime minister, Putin remained the de facto main power broker. 
The five-day, small-scale war between Russia and Georgia in Au-
gust 2008, which started with a successful Russian provocation, 
not only changed the local strategic situation in favour of Russia 
(by consolidating Russia’s control of the separatist regions of Ab-
khazia and South Ossetia, whose independence Russia formally 
recognised), but was also a proxy war with the United States35, 
for whom the Russian operation came as a big surprise. Another 
gain for Russia concerned the fact that it suddenly found itself the 
centre of attention (albeit as an enemy) of the US leadership and 
elite, and could no longer be ignored. Most importantly, the war 
destroyed the chances of Georgia and Ukraine joining NATO in 
the foreseeable future. The reactions of the US and the West were 
restrained to say the least. Unlike the EU, Washington did not im-
pose even symbolic sanctions, which strengthened Moscow’s con-
viction that its aggressive policy had proven effective. 
3. Russia and Obama’s two terms (2009-2016): from ‘reset’ 
to the Ukrainian and Syrian crises 
As Washington was debating ways to prevent a dangerous escala-
tion of the political conflict with Russia and normalise relations, 
34 See President Putin’s interview for the Russian media, 12 August 2012, http://
www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=873569&tid=60513 
35 The war was effectively an extension of the Russian Kavkaz 2008 military 
exercise held immediately after the conclusion of the US military exercise in 
Georgia. During the war, Russian forces seized some US military equipment 
located in Georgia and forced the evacuation of US military instructors. 
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Moscow, whose assertiveness was growing rapidly, adopted 
a wait-and-see attitude, while still demonstrating its potential 
to harm the US. It delivered a particularly hard blow in Febru-
ary 2009 by successfully pressuring Kyrgyzstan to terminate the 
agreement on the stationing of US air forces at the Manas airport 
near Bishkek.36 
The first step towards normalisation was taken by the US. At the 
Munich conference in February 2009, the US Vice-President Joe 
Biden called for a reset of relations between NATO and Russia. 
In March 2009, the heads of Russian and American diplomacy 
(Hillary Clinton and Sergei Lavrov) met to jointly press a sym-
bolic reset button and restart bilateral relations.37 The meeting 
opened a period of rapprochement between Russia and the US, 
from which both sides would derive some benefits. However, the 
reset policy did not resolve the ingrained contradictions of stra-
tegic interests, nor did it change the two sides’ diverging mutual 
perceptions or their respective understandings of the situation, 
which would later lead to a crisis and the ultimate failure of the 
reset policy. The Kremlin saw the reset as proof that its new ag-
gressive policy was working and as evidence of the United States’ 
weakness. Also, it treated the reset not so much as a mechanism 
for mutual compromise, but rather as Washington’s withdrawal 
from its previous policy, which in Moscow’s view had been wrong 
and anti-Russian. Russia’s contribution to the reset consisted in 
36 The base was an important logistics centre as part of the so-called Northern 
Distribution Network of the NATO and US forces stationed in Afghanistan. 
Apart from terminating the agreement, in January 2009 Russia provoked 
a new ‘gas war’ with Ukraine lasting several days, which was more dangerous 
than any of the previous ones and affected a large group of EU states, and also 
announced plans to re-create its navy supply points in Tartus, Syria, Socotra, 
Yemen and Tripoli, Libya (although only the first one would materialise sub-
sequently). Finally, Russia also started to develop closer political, energy and 
military co-operation with the regime of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela.
37 In hindsight, it may seem to have been a bad omen that the symbolic button, 
manufactured by the US side, was wrongly labelled in Russian as peregruzka 
(перегрузка, overload) instead of perezagruzka (перезагрузка, reset). 
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only limited concessions in spheres where it was also likely to 
gain, or where the calculation of costs and benefits justified them. 
One of the reasons for the reset’s limited success concerned Presi-
dent Dmitry Medvedev personally. For the West, Medvedev was 
a symbol of new and better bilateral relations, but contrary to 
appearances, he in fact shared Vladimir Putin’s vision of Russia’s 
strategic interests (with Russia as a great power controlling its 
own sphere of influence and jointly deciding on the global order). 
At that time Medvedev may only have differed from Putin in his 
conviction that tactics based on dialogue and limited co-operation 
with the West could be successful and help modernise the Russian 
economy, and thus strengthen Russia’s position as a global power 
– which was largely a repetition of Putin’s tactic during his first 
term. Most elites in the US and elsewhere in the West believed that 
Medvedev’s presidency would in the long term bring about real 
change in Russia and result in more pragmatic, or even liberal pol-
icies. For this reason they tried to support Medvedev, sometimes 
directly in opposition to Putin, whom they saw as a man thinking 
in obsolete, Cold War terms. Putin, who was planning his return 
to power, perceived that as an affront and yet another attempt at 
a ‘Western conspiracy’, which only accelerated the reset’s end.
Russia’s aims at that time included a withdrawal of the US military 
presence from Central Asia, which Russia regarded as its sphere 
of influence; at the same time, however, Moscow was interested 
in a continued US presence in Afghanistan. This was for two rea-
sons: firstly, because the war with the Taliban was concentrating 
the US and NATO’s resources in that country, as a result of which 
neither Washington nor the Alliance could devote much atten-
tion, for instance, to Eastern Europe; and secondly, their presence 
was reducing the risk of Islamic radicalism expanding towards 
Central Asia. In an extreme scenario, such an expansion could 
destabilise the Central Asian states and destroy Russian influ-
ence in the region, or require costly military involvement from 
Russia. This is why, in July 2009, Russia concluded a deal with the 
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US on military transit to and from Afghanistan via its territory.38 
This agreement could have potentially boosted Russia’s role in that 
transit, and offered Russia financial gains and a bargaining card 
in relations with Washington. In practice, however, its impact 
was limited because of the difficult financial and technical condi-
tions imposed by the Russian side. 
Russia also sought to conclude new deals with the US on re-
ducing strategic nuclear arsenals.39 This was related to Mos-
cow’s desire to cut the costs of maintaining its nuclear poten-
tial while at the same time preserving nuclear parity with the 
US (which was important mainly for political and prestige rea-
sons). Unlike the Bush administration, the Obama administra-
tion saw the idea of the gradual elimination of nuclear weap-
ons (Global 0) and nuclear non-proliferation as foreign policy 
priorities, which created a favourable setting for Moscow’s ef-
forts. In April 2010, after relatively short negotiations, the two 
sides signed a new Russian-American disarmament treaty, the 
so-called New START (which came into force quite quickly this 
time, in February 2011).40 
However, Russia did not give up demonstrating its military might, 
as became clear in August and September 2009 when it organised 
a series of large military exercises with aggressive scenarios on its 
38 Russia ratified the agreement in February 2011 and terminated it in May 2015. 
While Russia did play an important role in non-military supplies to Afghani-
stan (mostly of fuel and provisions: in 2012 the so-called Northern Distribu-
tion Network would at times account for as much as 85% of all supplies), its 
role in military transit was marginal. 
39 This was all the more important given the fact that the 1991 START 1 Treaty 
would expire by the end of 2009, the 1993 START 2 had not come into force, 
and the 2002 SORT Treaty was limited in scope. 
40 The New START treaty lowered the ceilings laid down in the previous treaties 
(by 10% to 30% in the case of the warheads ceiling under the SORT Treaty, and 
by 50% for the delivery vehicles’ ceilings under the START 1 Treaty). This was 
particularly convenient for Russia which could, at a low cost, reduce portions 
of its arsenal whose lifetime was about to expire.
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western flank.41 One of Russia’s priorities was invariably to stop 
the implementation of the missile shield project (strategic missile 
defence), especially in Central Europe. In fact, that had been one 
of the conditions on which Moscow agreed to sign the New START 
Treaty. Obama’s decision to scrap the original missile shield pro-
ject announced on 17 September 2009 was therefore welcomed 
in Moscow. However, it was not sufficient for Russia because at 
the same time President Obama announced a new, more limited, 
more flexible and cheaper variant of the project.42
One real concession that Russia made to the US concerned its con-
sent to impose a new, third wave of international sanctions on 
Iran, as it still refused to allow international supervision of its 
nuclear programme (sanctions were adopted by the UN Security 
Council in June 2010). Iran had previously rejected Russian pro-
posals to resolve the problem on several occasions. However, Rus-
sia’s agreement to the sanctions did not mean that Moscow had 
stopped co-operating with Tehran, even though it also made an 
important gesture to Washington by suspending (by a decree is-
sued by President Medvedev) a contract for the provision of S-300 
missile defence systems to Iran (the contract had been criticised 
by the US and Israel). 
The conclusion, in January and August 2011 and in April 2012, of 
deals between the US ExxonMobil and Russia’s state-controlled 
Rosneft on co-operation in the sphere of development of and oil 
extraction in Russia’s Arctic shelf and the Black Sea was a suc-
cess for Russia. The agreements offered Moscow a chance to raise 
capital and obtain the technologies needed to exploit the rich oil 
41 As part of the Zapad, Onega and Ladoga drills, Russia practiced moving mas-
sive forces long distances, as well as sea landings, and was reportedly plan-
ning to simulate an invasion of the Baltic States and a tactical nuclear attack 
on Warsaw.
42 The new plans envisaged replacing the projected counter-missile bases in 
Poland and the Czech Republic with a different type of missile (the SM-3 
used in the AEGIS navy system) deployed in bases in Romania (as of 2015) 
and Poland (as of 2018).
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deposits in the Russian shelf.43 They also finally created an oppor-
tunity to build a stronger economic basis for the relations with 
the US, which had long been Moscow’s aim.
The ratification of the 123 agreement on civilian nuclear co-opera-
tion by the US in September 2010 was another beneficial develop-
ment for Russia. It paved the way for Russian companies to access 
the lucrative US nuclear fuel market. Similarly, the agreement on 
the terms of Russia’s accession to the WTO, concluded in December 
2011 after several months of final talks, which ended an eighteen-
year(!) negotiation process and came into force in August 2012, was 
also potentially beneficial to Russia, as well as the US and EU states. 
However, it would soon turn out that Russia would not hesitate to 
violate its provisions. The WTO deal was likely the last outcome of 
the reset policy, which at that time was already in crisis.
This crisis became evident in March 2011 when President Medve-
dev’s decision that Russia would not veto the UN Security Council 
resolution authorising a humanitarian intervention (no-fly zone) 
in Libya, where rebels were fighting to topple Muammar Gaddafi’s 
regime, triggered an emotional and very critical response from 
Prime Minister Putin. To Putin, the Western military interven-
tion in Libya, which helped to topple Gaddafi, proved his con-
spiracy theory (shared by conservative members of the ruling 
group) that the ‘Arab Spring’ was part of a secret US operation to 
change the geopolitical order in the Greater Middle East in favour 
of Washington and to the detriment of Moscow. It was probably 
at that time that Putin decided to put an end to the US policy of 
regime change, and decided that he would do this in Syria (which 
was also becoming engulfed by an anti-government uprising). 
43 Under these agreements, a joint venture was established (Rosneft 66.7%, 
ExxonMobil 33.3%). According to Russian estimates, the combined reserves 
in the fields in question are around 5 billion tonnes of oil and 10 billion m3 of 
gas. ExxonMobil has transferred minority stakes in its fields in the US and 
Canada to Rosneft, and pledged to invest US$ 2.2 billion in geological works 
in the initial phase.
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When Putin announced in September 2011 that he would stand in 
the presidential election scheduled in March 2012, that marked 
the end of the hopes, shared by Russian liberals and Western 
elites, that Russia could gradually evolve towards adopting a dem-
ocratic domestic policy and a pragmatic foreign policy. When 
mass anti-government demonstrations took place in Moscow in 
December 2011, the paranoia of Putin and his circle reached a cli-
max. His statements and behaviour at that time showed that he 
was convinced that the demonstrations were a coup attempt in 
the form of another ‘colour revolution’, organised and supported 
mainly by Washington. His subsequent domestic and foreign pol-
icy decisions can therefore be seen as a specific form of aggressive 
‘self-defence’. 
Putin started his new term as president in May 2012 by personally 
affronting president Obama as he refused to attend the G8 sum-
mit in Camp David.44 What followed was a whole series of anti-
American decisions taken by the Kremlin (and countermeasures 
by the US). In September, Russia ordered the state USAID agency 
(which was supporting social projects) to leave the country. In 
December, responding to the adoption of the so-called Magnitsky 
Act by the US Congress,45 Russia enacted a law imposing retalia-
tory sanctions against a group of US officials and members of Con-
gress, and banned adoptions of Russian children by US nationals. 
44 The US side had intentionally moved the summit from Chicago (where a NATO 
summit, which Putin was not attending, was taking place immediately be-
forehand) in order to enable the Russian president to take part. In response, 
the White House announced that President Obama would not be attending 
the APEC summit in Vladivostok, Russia. 
45 The main aim of the Magnitsky Act was to penalise the Russian officials and 
functionaries involved in causing the death of Sergei Magnitsky, the lawyer 
of the US Hermitage Capital Fund, in jail in Russia in 2009, and profiting 
from it. The measures included a ban on travel to the US and a freeze of their 
US banking accounts. Around the same time, the US Congress abolished the 
Jackson-Vanik amendment which had been blocking the grant of most-fa-
voured nation status to Russia, however, the gesture was not appreciated in 
Moscow. 
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In January 2013, at the onset of President Barack Obama’s sec-
ond term, there was already no trace of the reset atmosphere in 
US/Russian relations. The Kremlin’s principally hostile attitude 
towards the US leadership could not be softened either by the 
change of the US Secretary of State (when John Kerry, welcomed 
with joy by his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov, replaced 
Hillary Clinton who had been publicly accused of Russophobia in 
Russia), or by the letters Obama sent to Putin. Because Moscow 
was continuing its campaign against the missile shield, in March 
2013 Obama once again restricted its scope by eliminating Mos-
cow’s greatest source of vexation, the so-called Phase 4 (which 
would have made it possible in future to intercept intercontinen-
tal ballistic missiles). As could be expected, the decision did not 
prompt Russia to lift its objections, but only resulted in a change 
of arguments,46 because Russia’s opposition was motivated not 
by military reasons, but mainly by geostrategic considerations 
(Russia objected to a permanent US military presence in Central 
Europe). Successive disarmament proposals extended by the US 
president in spring 2013 were ignored by Moscow. Instead, Russia 
stepped up its political and military support for the Syrian leader 
Bashar Assad whose regime was fighting an uprising against his 
rule. Moreover, in February 2013 Russia started to organise mas-
sive snap military exercises. 
The crisis in Russian-US relations deepened in June 2013 when Ed-
ward Snowden, the runaway former employee of NSA, the US elec-
tronic intelligence and counter-intelligence agency, was granted 
46 Initially, Russia claimed that the counter-missile trajectory was not correct 
(which was not true) and that the future expansion of the system could pose 
a threat to Russia’s strategic arsenal (which was technically impossible). Then 
it argued that the system could deepen the strategic imbalance and increase 
the United States capacity to block a retaliatory nuclear strike (which was 
absurd given the number of delivery vehicles in Russia’s possession). When 
the US decided not to implement Phase 4, Russia started to demand that the 
US withdraw from Phase 3 as well, claiming that the construction of the silos 
in the counter-missile bases would make it possible for the US to deploy of-
fensive nuclear weapons (which is not possible given the legal and political 
commitments adopted by the US and NATO).
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refuge in Russia, and soon afterwards started disclosing secret 
documents of US espionage programmes. Tensions escalated fur-
ther when Assad’s regime in Syria used chemical weapons against 
civilians in the suburbs of Damascus in August 2013, and the 
United States, along with the United Kingdom and France, started 
preparations for retaliatory strikes in Syria. To prevent them, 
Moscow agreed to conclude an agreement with the United States 
on the UN-supervised elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons, 
which, in turn, offered President Obama a pretext to refrain from 
intervening. That decision seems to have entailed far-reaching 
consequences, as it apparently led the Kremlin to conclude that 
Obama’s administration was trying to avoid involvement in the 
Syrian war at all costs, which paved the way for Russia to step up 
its own involvement in the conflict. 
An even deeper political confrontation occurred between the 
United States and Russia over the events in Ukraine. After the 
then President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych backtracked (under 
Russian pressure) on his commitment to conclude an Association 
Agreement with the EU, mass protests in Kyiv erupted in Novem-
ber 2013. As in 2004, Russia believed them to have been inspired 
and supported by the West, and the United States in particular. 
When the revolution toppled President Yanukovych in February 
2014, Russia responded aggressively, by militarily occupying and 
then illegally annexing Crimea in March 2014, and then in April 
2014 by stoking and militarily supporting a rebellion in Donbas 
in eastern Ukraine, which soon transformed into a regular, albeit 
low-scale war between Ukraine and Russia. This time the US and 
the EU responded strongly by imposing new political sanctions 
against Russia, as of March. After the rebels shot down a passen-
ger plane over the Donbas in July 2014, the sanctions were tough-
ened and extended to include financial and energy issues. Russia 
responded with counter-sanctions in August. On the other hand, 
especially in the early phase of the conflict, the US tried, with-
out much success, to broker a diplomatic resolution of the conflict, 
a role it subsequently largely ceded to Germany and France. For 
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Russia, the Ukrainian conflict was not only a way to subjugate 
Ukraine using forceful methods, but also a proxy conflict with the 
US. The statements and moves by Putin and his conservative aides 
at that time showed clearly that they treated the conflict as a bat-
tle against ‘Western, and mainly American aggression’ aimed at 
crowding Russian influence out from a key state in the post-Soviet 
area. On the other hand, Obama’s clear declarations to the effect 
that the US was unwilling to get involved militarily, and his re-
fusal to authorise arms supplies to Ukraine, were seen in Moscow 
as signs that the US feared a confrontation with Russia, which en-
couraged Moscow to continue its aggressive policy. 
However, in mid-2015 Russia very clearly started to de-escalate its 
direct involvement in the war in Ukraine as it was already pre-
paring to open up a ‘new front’ in its political struggle with the 
US. When in September 2015 the Obama administration ignored 
Putin’s call (formulated in the UN General Assembly) to create an 
anti-terror alliance against Islamic radicals with Russia, Moscow 
responded, on 30 September, by launching a limited military op-
eration in Syria, which had been in preparation for months, and 
was aimed at salvaging the Assad regime and demonstrating the 
inefficacy of the US policy of regime change. Russia’s brutal air-
strikes, which claimed large numbers of civilian lives, were not 
directed against the radicals of the so-called Islamic State, but 
mainly against the moderate Syrian opposition supported by the 
US and the Sunni monarchies of the Arab peninsula. By support-
ing Assad (and his backers from Iran and the terror organisation 
Hezbollah) and undermining the moderate Syrian opposition, 
Russia effectively demonstrated (at a relatively low cost to itself) 
that it was the main power broker in the conflict, while at the same 
time delivering a blow to the image of the United States, further 
undermined by the failures of the successive ceasefires which Sec-
retary of State John Kerry had tirelessly negotiated with Moscow. 
However, the prestige-boosting success in Syria was not enough 
for Russia, and Moscow decided to strike at the US directly. 
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As early as the summer of 2015, hackers associated with the 
Russian secret services launched a cyber operation targeting 
the Democratic Party, which was stepped up in the spring and 
summer of 2016.47 The materials intercepted at that time (some 
of which were compromising to the leadership of the Demo-
crats’ campaign and the candidate Hillary Clinton herself) were 
gradually published on Russia-friendly portals in autumn 2016. 
One of the operation’s aims was to increase the chances of Don-
ald Trump winning the election (the Republican candidate had 
made frequent statements implying the possibility of improved 
relations with Russia and deepening divides with the US’s West-
ern allies). But in the event of Clinton’s victory, they were also 
intended to weaken her position as president and contribute to 
internal political destabilisation in the United States (the at-
tempted cyber-attacks on regional polling stations in nearly half 
of the states served the same purpose). 
The deliberate exacerbation of the crisis in US-Russian relations, 
mainly over Syria, was apparently also an element in the cam-
paign against Clinton’s candidacy. When Russian aircraft bombed 
a humanitarian convoy near Aleppo in September 2016, another 
fragile ceasefire negotiated between Russia and the US broke 
down. Russia then stepped up its airstrikes on eastern Aleppo, 
killing large numbers of civilians as Western and Arab public 
opinion watched on in helpless outrage. Moreover, in early Octo-
ber 2016 President Putin signed a decree suspending the imple-
mentation of the Russian-American agreement on the disposal of 
plutonium, in which he also laid down a list of far-reaching politi-
cal conditions upon which the deal’s implementation could be re-
sumed.48 This was a propaganda exercise designed to highlight the 
47 FBI and NCCIC report, Grizzly Steppe. Russian Malicious Cyber Activity, 
29 December 2016, https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf 
48 The conditions included the withdrawal of US armed forces from Central 
Europe (back to 2000 levels); lifting of all sanctions against Russia and com-
pensating it for all the economic losses caused by the sanctions, and the US 
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dramatic new low in Russian-American relations (and to ‘blame’ 
it on the Democratic Obama administration, of which Hillary 
Clinton was a former member and potential continuator), while 
at the same time presenting Russia’s wish-list before the potential 
start of new talks on normalising relations. However, one should 
not overestimate the role that the Russian propaganda campaign 
and the cyber-attacks played in the outcome of the US presidential 
elections in November 2016, which Donald Trump won. Paradoxi-
cally, Russia’s greatest success was to make itself one of the main 
topics of the election campaign and be recognised by large parts 
of the US political elite as a dangerous enemy capable of influenc-
ing the internal politics of the American superpower, to President 
Putin’s unabashed satisfaction.49 
4. Russia on the Trump presidency (2017-):  
Moscow’s great hopes
The Kremlin and pro-Kremlin circles in Moscow greeted Donald 
Trump’s election victory on 8 November 2016 with barely con-
cealed enthusiasm,50 although they were also quite surprised by 
it, as Clinton had been the frontrunner. The belief that unlike Hi-
lary Clinton’s potential win, Donald Trump’s victory would offer 
a chance to improve Russian-American relations and bring ben-
efits to Russia was common not only among the ruling elite, but 
also among the general public, as opinion polls conducted just be-
fore the elections clearly demonstrated.51
withdrawing its programme of support for Ukraine. See http://asozd2.
duma.gov.ru/addwork/scans.nsf/ID/C4294ACB989FB546432580410044CB
71/$File/1186208-6_03102016_1186208-6.PDF?OpenElement 
49 Cf. President Putin’s statements at the Valdai forum, 27 October 2016, http://
en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53151 
50 For instance, State Duma deputies responded to the news of Trump’s victory 
with an ovation; Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Orthodox Church, person-
ally publicly blessed Trump; and many pro-Kremlin politicians and com-
mentators posted enthusiastic comments. 
51 In a VCIOM poll conducted in October 2016, 57% of respondents said the US 
elections would be important for Russia; 29% expected that US-Russia rela-
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It seems that the Kremlin had three main reasons to be so positive 
about Donald Trump: 
Firstly, Russian experts and politicians interpreted Trump’s suc-
cess as a symptom of a political crisis in the United States. They 
saw it as a manifestation of a rebellion by a large part of the US 
population against the political establishment and the political 
correctness of the liberal-dominated mainstream media. Trump’s 
win was also seen as a sign of rising isolationist sentiments, xeno-
phobia (the fear of ‘strangers’, especially Muslims) and the unwill-
ingness to pursue an active foreign policy (especially in the spirit 
of the liberal/conservative interventionism of the Clinton and 
Bush eras). The deep polarisation of public opinion in the US 
and the rise of internal tensions (which have not disappeared 
in the aftermath of the election, and may still be exacerbated) are 
evidently treated in Russia as factors which may weaken the 
US internally and likely erode its ability and willingness to 
get involved abroad, which opens a space for Russia to step up 
its own activity. Irrespective of what views and plans Trump 
himself has, he will not be able to completely ignore these 
sentiments in his political base.52 
Secondly, the rhetoric of Trump and some of his aides during the 
election campaign (e.g. the playing down of NATO’s role, pledges 
to make allied support conditional on the allies stepping up their 
financial contributions, plans to renegotiate or terminate impor-
tant trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Area 
tions would improve in the event of Trump’s victory, compared to 4% in the 
case of Clinton, while 8% expected a deterioration of relations in the event of 
Trump’s win, compared to 45% who believed relations would deteriorate if 
Clinton won. A poll by the Levada Centre showed that 41% of respondents who 
were interested in the election supported Trump, while 10% supported Clinton. 
52 The fact that Trump was referring to those emotions is clear if one looks at 
his inaugural address on 20 January 2017, in which he said that ‘America 
first’, a slogan referring back to the US isolationists of the 1930s, would be the 
guiding principle of his foreign policy. Cf. the Inaugural Address, 20 January 
2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural-address 
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(NAFTA) and critical attitudes towards the currently negotiated 
trans-Atlantic deal (TTIP) and the trans-Pacific agreement (TTP)) 
were a source of concern and (not always publicly displayed) irri-
tation in many allied states, both in Europe and in Asia. The elec-
tion’s outcome came as a real shock to the liberal elites in Europe 
(for example in Germany), leaving them deeply worried about the 
future. For the very same reasons, it was a source of hope and joy 
in Moscow, because it increased the likelihood that tensions 
between the US and its allies (including across the Atlantic) 
would exacerbate. Even though just after the election Trump 
and his circle toned down their most controversial campaign ar-
guments, the risk that the stance of the new administration could 
adversely affect NATO’s cohesion, activity and capacity to act 
did not disappear (NATO being seen in Russia as a strategic op-
ponent, an instrument of US policy, and a tool of America’s he-
gemony over Europe’s security sphere).
Thirdly, Trump’s previous business involvement, and the rhetoric 
used in the past by himself and some of his aides (including positive 
opinions on Vladimir Putin as a leader, declarations of readiness to 
‘reach a deal’ with Russia, frequent statements about the need to co-
operate with Moscow against the so-called Islamic State, statements 
which brushed over Russia’s aggressive policy towards Ukraine 
and the Baltic states, etc.), suggested that his approach to Russia 
would be ‘pragmatic’ and transactional. In the eyes of the Krem-
lin, that offered a chance for dialogue with President Trump which 
could enable at least some degree of strategic bargaining and further 
some of Russia’s vital interests (for example, in the post-Soviet area). 
For this reason, Moscow actively sought to establish contacts with 
Trump’s circle and the candidate himself as early as possible, in 
which it partly succeeded.53 After the elections Vladimir Putin 
53 Statements by the Russian deputy foreign minister Ryabkov, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Maria Zakharova, and to some extent also 
President Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, suggested that Russian dip-
lomats (including Sergei Kislak, the Russian ambassador in the US) had met 
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sent a friendly letter of congratulations to the president-elect, and 
several days later, the two leaders held a telephone conversation 
in which both sides declared that they were willing to normalise 
and positively develop bilateral relations.54 Also, some of Trump’s 
nominations for key administration positions, including in par-
ticular Gen. Michael Flynn55 for national security advisor and Rex 
Tillerson56 as secretary of state, could have been seen as signalling 
a readiness on the part of the US leadership for some new form of 
‘reset’ in relations with Russia.
Moscow very clearly started ‘investing’ into Trump even before 
his inauguration on 20 January 2017. For instance, while the Rus-
sian leadership condemned the decisions taken by the outgoing 
Obama administration in December 2016 to express its criticism 
of Russia, by extending the list of persons and bodies under US 
sanctions against Russia (including the FSB counterintelligence 
agency, the GRU intelligence agency and its leadership)57 and the 
with (unidentified) members of the ‘Trump team’ while the election cam-
paign was still underway.
54 Cf. the communications on the outcome of the phone conversation between 
Putin and Trump on 14 November 2016: the Russian version http://kremlin.
ru/events/president/news/53255, and the American version http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=119645 
55 General Michael Flynn, the former chief of Defense Intelligence Agency 
(DIA), was controversial for liberal commentators in the US because of 
Flynn’s appearances on Russia’s English-language television RT, a tool of Pu-
tin’s propaganda, and even attended its anniversary celebrations in Moscow 
where he sat at one table with President Putin. Some of Flynn’s statements 
were interpreted as endorsements of co-operation with Russia, especially in 
the field of fighting terrorism. 
56 Rex Tillerson has been the CEO of the oil company ExxonMobil since 2006, 
and for this reason he has been a frequent visitor in Moscow, where he would 
have signed agreements with the Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin and met Russian 
officials including President Putin, who in September 2012 awarded Tillerson 
the Order of Friendship for his contribution to the development of Russian-
American relations. For this reason, Tillerson was controversial not only for 
the Democrats, but also for a large group of influential Republicans. 
57 This decision, announced on 29 December 2016, was related to official allega-
tions that the Russian secret services had carried out a series of cyber-attacks 
in 2015 and 2016, targeting the US and especially the Democratic Party (while 
not mentioned by name). See the FBI and NCCIC report.
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expulsion from the US of 35 Russian diplomats accused of espio-
nage, by President Putin’s decision the Kremlin refrained from 
the retaliatory tit-for-tat measures that would have been the 
standard response.58
58 In his statement on 30 December, Putin very clearly implied that the decision 
had had been a provocation (effectively by the Obama administration) de-
signed to further damage Russian-American relations. He said that Russia’s 
reaction would depend on the policy towards Russia adopted by the Trump 
administration. On the same occasion, he extended New Year’s wishes to 
Obama, Trump and the American nation, and invited the children of US dip-
lomats to a New Year’s party in the Kremlin. The Russian Prime Minister 
Dmitry Medvedev responded less diplomatically as he Tweeted: “It is sad that 
the Obama administration, which began its life with renewed cooperation 
[with Russia], finishes it in anti-Russian agony. RIP”. 
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iii. lEssons for russian-amErican rElations: 
conclusions and outlook for thE futurE 
An analysis of the foundations of Russia’s policy towards the Unit-
ed States under Vladimir Putin and of its dynamics leads to sev-
eral general conclusions:
1. Structural asymmetry of relations
The structural asymmetry between the two countries, with all the 
problems it generates, is probably the most visible feature of Rus-
sian-American relations. This concerns not only the disproportion 
of potentials (especially in the economic dimension) between the 
US, which remains the dominant global power, and Russia, which 
is a declining multi-regional power despite its growing military 
might, but also the asymmetry of significance. While the United 
States is the main point of reference for Russia, for the US Russia 
has never been anything like that since the break-up of the USSR. 
Even though in view of Moscow’s aggressive policies Washington 
can no longer ignore Russia, no form of bipolar order can be re-
stored (and not just because of the rising power of China). 
Russia may gain some local advantages, but it is incapable of ac-
quiring the hallmark of all great powers, i.e. the ability to con-
vince others to follow it, or to impose its vision of order, even on 
the regional scale (as evidenced by the inefficacy of the so-called 
Eurasian integration, the failure of the ‘Great Europe’ idea, and 
the fact that Russia’s relations with China are increasingly asym-
metric). Russia has been unable to initiate an effective effort to 
resolve any regional or local conflicts (despite its efforts, it could 
not even resolve the Karabakh conflict, in which it has a dominant 
advantage and should be able to leverage its position). 
In this situation, Russia’s efforts to be noticed and taken seriously 
by Washington have been focused on demonstrating Russia’s po-
tential to cause harm. That potential is too large to be ignored by 
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the US, but also too small (at this stage) to cause the US to revise 
any of its policy priorities. Russia is too weak to be recognised by 
the US as an equal partner or enemy, but too strong to be willing 
or able to accept the status of America’s unequal, tactical ally.
2. Cyclic patterns in relations
Some regular patterns could be observed in the Russian-Amer-
ican relations over the last sixteen years. The inauguration of 
every new US administration has brought new hopes and been 
followed by efforts to improve relations, as well as proposals for 
a strategic deal on the part of Russia. Over time, however, the par-
ties have exhausted the potential for successes and positive ges-
tures, and the significant differences in mutual interests and per-
ceptions resurface. By the end of the tenure of each US president, 
the Russian-American relations were usually in crisis, and then 
the cycle would repeat. 
What is characteristic of these cycles is that with every iteration, 
the final crises get deeper and more difficult to recover from. This 
is undoubtedly related to the systematic growth of Russia’s inter-
national assertiveness, even though the country, struggling with 
economic difficulties and entering a phase of economic stagna-
tion, is long past the times when it optimistically believed that 
its power (especially economic power) would keep growing. The 
increasing depth of the crises is also related to the Kremlin’s in-
creasingly strong belief that assertive or even aggressive policies 
are effective. ‘The weak get beaten’ seems to be Vladimir Putin’s 
political creed.59 The Kremlin’s growing sense of threat from the 
US, which is felt particularly strongly in the aftermath of every 
new ‘colour revolution’, ‘Arab Spring’ or wave of protests within 
Russia itself, guides Russia to demonstrate its determination to 
59 Putin used the phrase in his statement after the terror attack in Beslan in 
September 2004; http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22589. 
Later he frequently referred to similar ideas.
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fight for its interests, in line with the above maxim. On top of that, 
in today’s ‘post-truth’ world it is easier for Russia to use skilful 
propaganda to present itself as stronger than it really is, and even 
to present its failures as successes. 
Paradoxically, it could be partly because of the unprecedented 
depth of the current crisis in Russian-American relations at 
the end of Obama’s administration that the hopes for a positive 
change under Donald Trump are higher than ever before in Rus-
sia. Another reason for that may concern the uniqueness of the 
Trump phenomenon – that is, the President’s views, political style 
and personality – in US political culture and life. In a situation 
where improving Russian-American relations might require non-
standard moves, Trump seems to be capable of acting in a non-
standard way. 
3. Outlook for the future: from reset to crisis?
It is a paradox that the Russian ruling elite views the United States 
as a very influential actor, allegedly pulling the strings in many 
regional and global developments, while at the same time por-
traying it as a ‘declining power’ struggling with an internal cri-
sis. The Russian conviction that the US is in a deep crisis (which 
forms part of the wider crisis of the entire West) was consider-
ably strengthened by Donald Trump’s election victory (which was 
perceived as a rebellion by parts of American society against the 
establishment). 
This is probably related to the fact that members of the Russian 
leadership are aware that Russia’s economic problems are systemic 
and long-term while its original development model has exhaust-
ed its potential, while at the same time lacking any new ideas for 
an alternative model that could ensure stable long-term develop-
ment and allow the current elite to stay in power. Because of this 
perceived weakness, Russia is inclined to seek a modus vivendi with 
the West, including the United States, independently of its efforts 
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to build a closer tactical alliance with China (perceived as the fu-
ture superpower). Russia’s position towards the United States in 
the longer term will depend – apart from US policy and develop-
ments in key regions – on which weakness, Russia’s or America’s, 
the Kremlin considers to be deeper and exacerbating faster. 
It is difficult to predict at this stage how Russian-American rela-
tions will develop. Their prospects depend on too many factors 
in the United States, in Russia and globally, and also on Donald 
Trump himself, who is still quite a mystery as a politician. How-
ever, it is nonetheless possible to outline some elements, both pos-
itive and negative, that will influence the two states’ relations in 
the future.
Out of Russia’s list of ‘wishes and grievances’ in relations with the 
United States, the problems concerning Russia’s internal policy 
will in theory be relatively the easiest to solve. The earlier hopes 
that Russia could join the group of democratic states pursuing pro-
Western policies in the near future (or ever) have been abandoned 
not only by Trump, but apparently by a majority of the Ameri-
can establishment. The only question that remains is whether the 
pathologically distrustful President Putin and his conservative 
aides will believe that the United States has once and for all given 
up the idea of effectuating regime change in Russia.
A gradual thaw in Russian-American economic relations is also 
imaginable, especially in the energy sector, even if a swift and 
complete abolition of US sanctions against Russia would be diffi-
cult because of the prevailing sentiments in Congress and among 
the US public. The appointment of Rex Tillerson as US Secretary of 
State would undoubtedly bring that prospect closer. However, even 
leaving aside the bad investment climate, the implementation of 
ExxonMobile’s ambitious plans in Russia may stumble on the fact 
that most of these projects are not economically viable given the 
current global market trends, and in particular the prospect of oil 
prices remaining relatively low (despite short-term fluctuations). 
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The fight against international terrorism, and especially Islamic 
terrorism, is another sphere in which reaching agreement and 
starting co-operation, at least at the level of declarations, would 
be relatively easy. Deeper political and intelligence co-operation 
is possible, although the two sides’ past record of instrumentally 
using Islamic radicalism for political ends may prove to be an ob-
stacle and engender distrust. Moreover, in the opinion of many 
members of the American political establishment and the intel-
ligence community, by carrying out its cyber-attacks on the US 
Russia has crossed certain ‘red lines’, for which the US side may 
be inclined to retaliate. 
The prospects of possible co-operation between the US and Rus-
sia in Syria are also linked to the above problem. Assuming that 
the Trump administration could accept Russia’s fundamental 
demand, which concerns providing de facto (if not formal) sup-
port to the Assad regime, the two sides might be able to reach an 
agreement, and Russia might temporarily step up its military 
involvement in Syria in coordination with the US. However, the 
prospects of a lasting peace settlement in Syria will nonetheless 
remain highly uncertain, because of the multiplicity of actors in-
volved in the conflict and their often-contradictory interests. 
There is a big question mark over another issue of key importance 
for Russia, i.e. the United States’ willingness to recognise, at least 
informally, the post-Soviet area as a Russian sphere of influence. 
While there are no reasons to believe that the area (or even just 
Ukraine) will remain a policy priority for the US, any moves to 
give up US involvement in the region completely (not to mention 
moves to directly support Russia) would certainly be opposed in 
the US not only by the Democratic opposition, but also the Repub-
lican elite.
The same applies to Russia’s postulates concerning Central Eu-
ropean countries and the rest of Europe. The likely objections by 
these states, which would be the US’s policy objects and partners 
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in this regard, may make it hard to meet Russia’s demands, even if 
one assumes some goodwill on the part of the US (which does not 
seem realistic). Russia should not expect a dismantling of NATO 
or an end to the US military presence in Europe. Even scrapping 
the missile shield plans seems to be hard to reconcile with the 
new administration’s views of the Iran problem. 
Likewise, there are no reasons to believe that Russia’s demands 
concerning global political and security issues will be met. It is 
unclear whether the US will be willing to ‘pay’ Russia for refrain-
ing from deeper co-operation with China, which Washington sees 
as a strategic rival. Even if an illusion that such a policy could be 
effective were to take root in the White House, it will soon be veri-
fied by political realities. Concerning global economic issues, the 
failure of TTIP and TPP will not mean better chances of success 
for any alternative projects involving Russia. 
Russia has very little, if anything at all, to offer the United States 
in a positive sense. What it can do is limit the harmful impacts of 
its negative actions. That, however, may turn out to be insufficient 
from Washington’s point of view. 
With all the hopes surrounding Donald Trump’s presidency, Rus-
sia cannot be sure what the specific direction of US policy will be. 
Moscow runs the risk that its potential aggressive actions in fu-
ture (which it may, for instance, take to force Washington to take 
a decision in line with Russia’s expectations) will be met with 
a firm reaction on the part of Trump (partly because of the lat-
ter’s need to protect his image); such a turn of events may under-
mine the image of Russia as a world power as nurtured by Russian 
propaganda, and could sour mutual relations. 
For the above reasons it seems most likely that Russian-American 
relations will go through another iteration of the typical cycle: 
Trump’s presidency will start with a new attempt at resetting re-
lations with Russia, and end with a new crisis in mutual relations. 
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However, that does not mean that Russia will inevitably suffer 
a strategic defeat. The prospect of growing tensions between the 
United States and its allies, as well as rivals such as China, a deep-
ening crisis of trans-Atlantic relations and of Western institutions 
will put Russia in a position to gain some comparative advantages, 
even as it grows weaker, and will create a strong temptation for 
Moscow to use them. A Russia whose strength derives from the 
West’s weakness may become even more assertive and aggressive, 
contributing to growing regional and global instability. 
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